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Monetary Policy Committees differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared 
and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper we show analytically how different 
arrangements could affect the voting behaviour of individual MPC members and 
therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results to the Bank of England and the 
Federal Reserve. A general finding is that when MPC members are not too diverse in 
terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions should not be based on pre- 
prepared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as a 
majority of views expressed by the members, as is the case at the Bank of England 
and appears to be the case in the FOMC under Chairman Bernanke. 
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 Non-technical summary
Central banking has undergone a tremendous transformation over the last
twenty years (see (Blinder 1998, 2004)). A prominent example is the collec-
tive character of policy decision-making, see also BIS (2009). According to
Fry et al. (2000), in the late 1990s 79 out of 88 surveyed central banks had
committees to make policy decisions. Central banking by committee by now
has become the rule rather than the exception. Whether or not this results in
better monetary policy however is not clear. As noted by the political science
literature, the superiority of committee decision making can depend on for ex-
ample the voting rule used, see e.g. Nitzan and Paroush (1985). Practitioners,
most prominently Blinder (2004, 2007), however, take a rather benign view,
by arguing that collective monetary policy decision making should result in
better outcomes, due to the pooling of information, models and expertise.
This paper adds to the rapidly growing literature on monetary policy
committee decision making by investigating analytically whether an observed
diﬀerence between the procedures applied by real monetary policy commit-
tees, the organization of the interest rate meeting, and in particular the origin
and timing of the interest rate proposal, has a bearing on the policy outcome.
We focus our study on two of the most inﬂuential monetary policy authorities
in the world, i.e. the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee and the
Federal Open Market Committee. This is also because these central banks
provide a large amount of information about the policy-making cycle. They
moreover provide information that allows for empirically testing our conclu-
sions, i.e. attributed votes and even verbatim transcripts of discussions (in
the case of the Federal Open Market Committee).
The stylized monetary policy committee meeting begins with a presen-
tation of recent economic and ﬁnancial developments by central bank staﬀ,
updating the reports that were disseminated to all members before the meet-
ing. Then members discuss the economic outlook and, subsequently, the
appropriate policy stance. Finally, a policy proposal is put to a vote. The
proposal can be prepared a priori (in our model — by the Board), which is
the tradition in the Federal Open Market Committee, or can be made by the
Chair to reﬂect the majority of views presented in the meeting, which seems
to be the tradition in the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England.
A major contribution of our paper is the modelling approach, constitut-
ing a merger between two strands of modelling collective decision-making
processes and their outcomes: the traditional statistical approach and the
new game-theoretic one. We have modelled the interest rate meeting as a
game among rational decision makers, who independently form their views
on the economic situation and the necessary interest rate decision. The sta-
tistical approach inﬂuence in our model is the independent nature of the views,
based on the signals about the state of the economy independently sent by
nature to all decision makers, and the assumption that the policy decision
can be reduced to a binary choice: a change or no change in interest rates.
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decision makers do not mechanistically vote in line with their views (or: the
signals they have received). In our model the decision makers choose their ac-
tions in the meeting (votes) such that those actions maximize their expected
utility from the committee’s decision, on the basis of their judgment of the
state of the economy and voting strategies they expect others to follow. Our
setup is hence a modiﬁcation of the seminal work of Austen-Smith and Banks
(1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) on juries.
Our results show that the organization of the monetary policy committee
meeting and the timing of the interest rate proposal are not immaterial to
the actions of the committee members and hence to policy outcomes. For
example, the announcement of a prior policy proposal early in the meeting,
before members have revealed their preferred policy options, could actually
give rise to three possible voting equilibria: (1) A herding equilibrium, where
all members vote in favour of (follow) the Board’s interest rate proposal. The
proposal is adopted with no dissents. In this case, the proposal acts as a com-
mon signal and crowds out the members’ private information, in analogy to
the seminal result by Morris and Shin (2002). (2) An informative equilibrium,
where the Board supports its proposal but other members ignore the proposal
and vote in line with their private preferred policy options. The proposal may
be overruled if the Board has no majority in the committee. Most likely there
will be dissents among non-Board committee members at the voting stage.
(3) A cheap-talk equilibrium, where even the Board does not automatically
support the prior proposal in the policy meeting; all members vote in line
with their private preferred policy options. The proposal is irrelevant for the
ﬁnal policy outcome; it’s only function is to enlarge the information set of
all committee members. Almost certainly there will be dissents among the
members at the voting stage.
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Central banking has undergone a tremendous transformation over the last
twenty years (see (Blinder 1998, 2004)). A prominent example is the collec-
tive character of policy decision-making. According to Fry et al.(2000), in
the late 1990s 79 out of 88 surveyed central banks had committees to make
policy decisions. Central banking by committee by now has become the rule
rather than the exception, see also BIS (2009). Whether or not this results
in better monetary policy however is not clear. Theory suggests that col-
lective decision making consistent with optimal individual behaviour requires
MPC members to condition their votes on those of their colleagues. And, as
noted by the political science literature, the superiority of committee decision
making can depend on for example the voting rule used, see e.g. Nitzan and
Paroush (1985). The early economic literature on collective decision making in
a monetary policy context noted that preferences and strategic considerations
between committee members might adversely aﬀect the quality of collective
monetary policy outcomes (see e.g. Waller (1989, 1992), Von Hagen and Süp-
pel (1994), Grüner (1999), Hefeker (2003) and Sibert (2003)). More recently,
Blinder (2004, 2007) takes a more benign view, by arguing that collective
monetary policy decision making should result in better outcomes, due to the
pooling of information, models and expertise.
This paper adds to the rapidly growing literature on monetary policy com-
mittee (henceforth: MPC) decision making by starting from the stylized fact
that in reality MPCs around the world operate diﬀerently and are organized
diﬀerently, see Fry et al. (2000), Lybek and Morris (2004) or Maier (2007).
These diﬀerences span many dimensions, such as size, composition of mem-
bership, decision-making rules and the way the meeting is structured. Some
of these diﬀerences have been shown to have an impact on the behaviour of
MPC members. Gerlach-Kristen (2003) for example showed that diﬀerent
types of members of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England
(internal vs external members) diﬀer in the frequency and the duration of
dissents, and in preferences to dissent for lower or higher policy rates. Bhat-
tacharjee and Holly (2005), Spencer (2006) and Groth and Wheeler (2008),
among others, have shown that these dissents can be explained by varying
sensitivities to changes in macroeconomic situation, to deviations of inﬂation
forecasts from the target and to diﬀerences in the way individual members as-
similate information supplied to them (diﬀerent ’mind-sets’). Chappell et al.
(2005) report results analogous to Gerlach-Kristen (2003) for the US. Further,
Chappell et al. (2004, 2005, 2007a, 2007b) have shown the eﬀects of a strong
chairman on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members’ interest
rate proposals. Meade and Sheets (2005) documented the eﬀects of regional
background on individual FOMC members’ interest rate proposals. Finally,
Meade and Stasavage (2008) showed the eﬀects of a publication of verbatim
transcripts of the FOMC meetings on the debate among the members.
Our contribution is that we investigate analytically whether an observed
7
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i.e. the origin and timing of the interest rate proposal, has a bearing on the
policy outcome.1 The stylized MPC meeting begins with a presentation of
recent economic and ﬁnancial developments by central bank staﬀ, updating
the reports that were disseminated to all members before the meeting. Then
members discuss the economic outlook and, subsequently, the appropriate
policy stance. Finally, a policy proposal is put to a vote. The proposal can be
prepared a priori, which is the case in the Federal Open Market Committee,
or can be made by the Chair to reﬂect the majority of views presented in the
meeting, which seems to be the case at the Monetary Policy Committee of
the Bank of England. We show that, if the proposal is presented early in the
meeting, it can act as a common signal and crowd out the members’ private
information, in analogy to the seminal result by Morris and Shin (2002). We
subsequently show that this can have adverse eﬀects on the prior probability
that the MPC reaches correct policy decisions. In most cases, it is preferable
not to have a prior policy proposal at all.
We start in the next section by discussing the practice and stylized facts
of monetary policy decision making in the FOMC and the Bank of England’s
Monetary Policy Committee. It will become clear that, at least under some
chairmen, those central banks diﬀer substantially in terms of the origin and
timing of the interest rate proposal to be voted on by the MPC. We will then
turn, in section 3, to a model that allows us to analyze the consequences
of these diﬀerences for the voting behaviour of individual members. The
predictions of this model are presented and discussed in section 4. Section 5
concludes. Formal analysis is presented in an Appendix.
2 Decision-making cycle of a monetary policy committee
To highlight the relevance of diﬀerences in organizational arrangements be-
tween MPCs, we study two of the most inﬂuential monetary policy author-
ities in the world, i.e. the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee
and the Federal Reserve System’s FOMC. 2 The Monetary Policy Committee
publishes minutes and attributed votes, while the FOMC publishes minutes,
votes and even verbatim transcripts of discussions.
The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee is made up of nine
members — ﬁve internal members (the Governor, the two Deputy Governors,
the Bank’s Chief Economist and the Executive Director for Markets) and
four external members, appointed to ensure that the Committee beneﬁts from
external thinking and expertise in addition to that gained inside the Bank of
1To avoid confusion between any MPC and the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank
of England, in the text we will always write out the full name of the latter.
2These central banks also provide a large amount of information about their functioning.
They are not unique in that respect, however, as the same could be said for the central banks
of, say, the euro area, Japan, Sweden, Norway or New Zealand. Some of these central banks
diﬀer from the Federal Reserve and Bank of England in that they have monetary policy
deliberations that focus on future paths of interest rates. We sidestep the latter issue, as it
is beyond the scope of this paper.
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The policy cycle begins on Friday before the Monetary Policy Committee
meeting with a brieﬁng session, known as ’the pre-MPC meeting’. In this
meeting the Bank of England staﬀ presents the important economic news
of the previous month. The meeting also includes reports from the Bank’s
regional agents on the information they received from their business contacts
around the country. The pre-meeting is attended by all Committee members
"...so that they can prepare for the following week’s policy meeting on an
equal footing..." (BoE, 2006, p. 7).
The policy meeting takes two days, typically Wednesday and Thursday.
On the ﬁrst day, the committee discusses the economic situation, with each
member giving his or her view or interpretation. "... Wednesday is not a
time for actually discussing the interest rate decision itself. Rather, it is
the moment for exploring the diﬀerent issues which will help to shape each
member’s decision the following day. Members never talk to each other at any
time about what they are likely to do when the votes are cast on Thursday
morning. Instead, they reach their decision in their own way, and in their own
minds..." (BoE, 2006, p. 11). On Thursday, the interest rate decision is taken.
First, the Governor speaks "...summarizing the previous day’s discussion in a
balanced and neutral way. He does not attempt to direct the outcome of the
meeting. [...] After each person has spoken, the Governor invites questions: he
himself speaks, and votes, last.3 The decision goes to the majority and there
is no attempt to arrive at a consensus: members are individually accountable
for their decisions..." (BoE, 2006, p.11-12). It is clear from this description
that there is no attempt to arrive at a high degree of consensus; the decision
goes to the majority.4 Hence, we observe (see Table 1 below, data obtained
from the website of the Bank of England) quite a high share of voting dissents
among the Committee members.
% meetings with dissents AVG % dissents per meeting
Governor George 58% 22%
Governor King 62% 20%
Table 1. Monetary Policy Committee voting dissents under Governors
George and King (period July 1997 - July 2008)
The US Federal Reserve has diﬀerent arrangements. Its Federal Open
Market Committee consists of twelve members — seven members of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the president of the Federal
3According to BoE (2006), this practice was started by Governor George and is now
maintaned by Governor King.
4This behaviour is in practice facilitated (if not encouraged) by the fact that the mem-
bers of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England are individually - not
collectively - accountable. Note, however, that in our theoretical model, as described in the
following section, we will assume that each committee member cares about the accuracy of
the collective decision, not about the accuracy of her individual vote.
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presidents, who serve on a rotating basis. The FOMC meets eight times per
year.
The policy cycle of the FOMC also begins in the week preceding the pol-
icy meeting (typically on Thursday) with the circulation of the Greenbook
containing the staﬀ’s forecast and analysis of the outlook as well as a de-
tailed analysis of recent developments in the economy and ﬁnancial markets.
The next document circulated before the FOMC meeting (typically about
mid-morning on Saturday) is the Bluebook, containing two or three policy
options, that will be presented in the meeting. On Monday before the FOMC
meeting the Federal Reserve Board holds a meeting, where the staﬀ makes a
more detailed presentation of the outlook to the Board. The presidents are
briefed by their own staﬀs (brieﬁngs that may include separate forecasts pre-
pared within the regional reserve banks) and also get copies of the brieﬁngs
presented to the Board by its staﬀ each week..." (Meyer, 1998). According
to Meyer (2004), the Monday morning Board meeting has also been used
by Chairman Greenspan to communicate his views to Board members and
garner support for them (p. 50-51). The FOMC meeting begins on Tues-
day with presentations by the staﬀ. This is followed by a general discussion
where "...Each member of the FOMC presents his or her own views on the
outlook [...] The current practice is that Bank presidents generally go ﬁrst,
because they have information that the governors do not have — information
about developments in their own regions...". At this stage, Bank presidents
also comment on the Greenbook forecasts, conveying (when relevant) also the
forecasts prepared within the regional central banks. The FOMC then turns
to policy. This round begins with the presentation on policy options by the
Director of Monetary Aﬀairs. Then the FOMC members express their views.
There is no ﬁxed speaking order. Chairman Greenspan used to go ﬁrst, which
gave him "...the opportunity to lead the Committee, both toward the posi-
tion he is advocating and toward a consensus...." (Meyer, 1998) Chairman
Bernanke, on the other hand, is believed to speak last (Wall Street Journal
(2006)). After this policy round, the Chairman makes the consensus policy
proposals and votes ﬁrst on it.
Table 2 below presents summary statistics for the dissents in the preferred
policy rates among FOMC members (what we call deliberation dissents) under
Chairmen Burns and Greenspan, calculated on the basis of the data from
Chappell et al. (2007a, 2005). In parentheses we also present voting data.
The table illustrates a very high occurrence of dissents under Chairman Burns.
This would support the claim of Romer and Romer (2004), that, Chairman
Burns had "rapidly ﬂuctuating and often unrealistic views".
10
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Chairman Burns 93% (37%) 58% (14%)
Chairman Greenspan 65% (50%) 25% (15%)
Table 2. FOMC deliberation (voting) dissents under Chairmen Burns and
Greenspan (period February 1970 - February 1978,
August 1987 - December 1996)
Notwithstanding the diﬀerences between Chairmen Burns and Greenspan,
the proportion of deliberation dissents is still substantial. However, using the
voting data, the number and frequency of dissents is much smaller (especially
when one extends the time sample for Chairman Greenspan to include his
whole tenure, i.e. until January 2006; the share of meetings with dissents then
drops to 36%) probably illustrating the tradition of supporting the Chairman.
The description above represents, to the best of our knowledge, the actual
functioning of both MPCs. It illustrates that the (voting) behaviour of its
members diﬀer. Moreover, the FOMC and the Monetary Policy Committee
diﬀer regarding the origin of the interest rate proposal, with the FOMC using
a pre-prepared proposal (or set of options) as a basis for discussion and the
Monetary Policy Committee voting on a proposal that follows more or less
endogenously from the preceding discussions. This diﬀerence is more general,
as the survey of Maier (2007) shows: in 11 out of 30 central banks surveyed
the proposal is prepared a priori and presented in the meeting, the remainder
having either other arrangements or no formal arrangements. Given this
plethora of observed arrangements, we are interested in investigating whether
these diﬀerences are material in that they aﬀect the behaviour of individual
MPC members. To this end, we will in the next section construct a model that
captures the most important elements of a meeting of a MPC. Such a meeting
is preceded by a dissemination of macroeconomic reports to all its members,
written by central bank staﬀ. The meeting begins with the presentation of
recent economic and ﬁnancial developments by the staﬀ. Then MPC members
begin their discussions, ﬁrst with the economic outlook and then speciﬁcally
regarding the appropriate interest rate. The discussion closes with a vote on
a policy proposal. The proposal can be prepared a priori by either staﬀ or the
Board, which to the best of our knowledge seems to be the case in the FOMC,
or not, which seems to be the case at the Monetary Policy Committee of the
Bank of England. It seems a priori obvious that, when the prior proposal is
made, the timing of its presentation in the MPC meeting becomes important.
The proposal can be made at the beginning of policy discussions or just before
the voting round, after other MPC members have had a chance to reveal
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Our objective is to analyze the eﬀects of the origin and timing of the policy
proposal on the voting behaviour of MPC members. Our MPC is diverse
as deﬁned by Hong and Page (2001, 2004) in that its members have lim-
ited abilities and diﬀer in the way they encode and approach problems. This
heterogeneity between members is closely related to what Blinder (2007) de-
scribes as diﬀerent mind sets. It provides the basis for an explanation of why
collective eﬀort can outperform the individual: by virtue of being diﬀerent,
individuals can improve upon each other’s solution to a problem. Applied to
an MPC with a single mandate, e.g. to maintain price stability, individual
members diﬀer in translating the (commonly) available economic information
into risks to price stability (diﬀerent perspectives) and in the way of deal-
ing with the identiﬁed risks to price stability (diﬀerent heuristics). Bringing
these diverse individuals together in a MPC meeting then enlarges the set of
all diﬀerent ways of solving a problem, that is: taking the correct monetary
policy decision. This description of diversity is widely accepted in the ﬁeld
of organizational behaviour, and Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005) provide em-
pirical evidence of the relevance of these diﬀerences for the case of the MPC
in the UK. The diversity of views believed to increase the beneﬁts from col-
lective decision-making (see Blinder (2004, 2007)) is in many cases grounded
in law. Take the US FOMC. Regarding the Board, the Federal Reserve Act
states "...In selecting the members of the Board, not more than one of whom
shall be selected from any one Federal Reserve district, the President shall
have due regard to a fair representation of the ﬁnancial, agricultural, indus-
trial, and commercial interests, and geographical divisions of the country..."
(Section 10) According to Chairman Bernanke, "...an important strength of
the Federal Open Market Committee is its diversity. The Board members
and Reserve Bank presidents who sit around the table at each meeting of the
FOMC bring a wide range of perspectives to the deliberations that reﬂect the
participants’ professional backgrounds, the regions of the country with which
they are most familiar, and their diﬀering approaches to economic and pol-
icy analysis..." (Bernanke (2007)).5 The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy
Committee is also composed of members with diﬀerent background (internal
and external members). "...The argument for including external members is
that they bring in a wider range of expertise and experience than would be
available if the MPC could draw only on the Bank’s own staﬀ. And they
bring fresh thinking to the Committee since they are only there for a limited
period..." (BoE, 2006, p. 3). In order to focus on these eﬀects and their
5To be fair, this paper only looks at the economic implications of committee decision
making. It sidesteps the political dimensions. However, the fact is that some MPCs are part
of central banks that are organized along federal lines. It has been argued (see Hefeker, 2003)
that these central banks and their MPCs reﬂect a political compromise between regions,
that insist on representation, and a board appointed by the central governing body. Thus,
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where members share objectives and priors. We think that these are reason-
able assumptions in the context of MPCs. There might be (and probably are)
diﬀerent personal judgments among members of the MPC about, say, the rel-
ative social costs of inﬂation versus unemployment (and therefore individual
preferences might diﬀer). These diﬀerences should however be largely irrele-
vant because the legal mandate of the central bank ought to tell committee
members what their loss function is. Of course, when the legal mandate of
the central bank is less precise, MPC members have more scope to interpret
their mandate diﬀerently. The FOMC is a case in point. However, even then
we believe that members typically do their best to deliver on these common
objectives, if only for reputational reasons (see e.g. Goodhart (2001)). This
leads us to conclude that, while it is impossible to exactly identify the reasons
for diﬀerences in policy recommendations of MPC members, the logic of hav-
ing a committee to decide on policy suggests that diﬀerent mind sets is at least
as promising a candidate as diﬀerent preferences. For models where commit-
tee members are assumed to have common abilities but diﬀerent preferences,
see e.g. von Hagen and Süppel (1994) and Grüner (1999). Our model is not
suited to address both potential sources of heterogeneity simultaneously, as
diﬀerent preferences distort the results regarding the link between the meet-
ing organization, information and the MPC outcome. In the limit, the MPC
outcome would solely stem from the relative size of the activist group vs the
gradualist group.
We model the MPC meeting as a game among rational decision makers,
who choose sequentially rational voting strategies that maximize their ex-
pected utility from the committee’s decision, on the basis of their judgment
of the state of the economy and voting strategies they expect others to follow.
As a result we employ models commonly used in the modern jury literature.
The formal analysis is presented in the Appendix to this paper. However,
given the fact that jury models are relatively new to the economic literature,
we give some basic ideas here.6
Each committee member cares about taking the correct decision, based
on the economic conditions and outlook. The state of the economy is uncer-
tain; the economy can be in either of two states: in state a where economic
conditions require a change of the policy rate (decision A), or in state b where
the appropriate decision is to keep rates unchanged (decision B). The binary
structure is particularly valid for monetary policy decisions, as it is usually
fairly clear in what direction interest rates should be moved, if they were to
be moved7, and the size of a move has nowadays become fairly standardized
6Our setup is a modiﬁcation of the seminal work of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) on juries. Persico (2004) oﬀers a comprehensive overview
of the related literature. See Osbourne (2004) for a general discussion of Bayesian games.
Gerlach-Kristen (2006) and Meade and Stasavage (2008) constitute other applications of
jury and expert models to the analysis of MPCs.
7See Gerlach-Kirsten (2007) for empirical evidence corroborating this for the Monetary
Policy Committee of the Bank of England.
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Hence, the correct MPC decisions are: decision A in state a and decision
B in state b. The utility of each MPC member can be therefore written as:9
ui (d = A|a)=ui (d = B|b) = 1 (1)
ui (d = A|b)=ui (d = B|a) = 0 (2)
Committee members do not observe the state of the economy. Rather,
each of them independently forms judgment on the state of the economy
and the appropriate policy decision, based on the shared information and
brieﬁngs by their own staﬀ. We model this by assuming that each MPC
member receives a private independent signal si, which imperfectly reveals
the state of the economy. Imperfectness of the signal means that receiving
information pointing in the direction of decision A gives only qi certainty that
the true state of the economy is a. Formally:
Pi(si =A|a) = Pi(si = B|b) = qi (3)
Pi(si =B|a) = Pi(si = A|b) = 1 − qi (4)
In our analysis we will interpret qi as the accuracy of individual judg-
ment. We will assume 0.5 < qi < 1. These restrictions imply that forming a
committee to take interest rate decisions is useful.
At any point in time, the set of actions for any MPC member is a set of
votes vi ∈ {A,B}. Rationality among MPC members implies selecting vot-
ing strategies that maximize their expected utility from the MPC’s decision,
calculated over all states of the world and all possible actions of other commit-
tee members (since the latter aﬀect the collective decision d and therefore the
utility of every individual), rather then simply voting in line with their private
signals. Rational voting will imply that each committee member will restrict
the analysis of her voting strategy to the cases when her vote aﬀects the ﬁnal
outcome, i.e. when it is pivotal (see Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)).
If we denote the probability that an individual member assigns to the
economy being in state b conditional on her information as P(b|info), the
expected utility from changing interest rates or not (decision A or B) is:
E [ui(d = A)]=P(b|info)ui (d = A|b)+ (1− P(b|info))ui (d = A|a)
=1 − P(b|info) (5)
E[ui (d = B)]=P(b|info)ui (d = B|b) + (1 − P(b|info))ui (d = B|a)
=P(b|info) (6)
8See also Meade and Stasavage (2008). Recent responses of central banks to the ﬁnancial
turmoil, with a number of central banks changing interest rates by much more, imply that
it becomes increasingly diﬃcult to qualify moves of 50 basis points as extreme.
9We assume that MPC members’ preferences are symmetric: each member considers an
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P(b|info) > 1 − P(b|info) ⇔ P(b|info) > 0.5 (7)
and A otherwise. The probability P(b|info) depends on all the information
that the member has: the information received before the meeting (her own
private signal si); the information received during the meeting, i.e. the interest
rate proposal (or the private signals of other MPC members) if she observes
them before she casts her vote; and the information she can deduce about the
information possessed (i.e. signals) by other committee members from the
assumption that her vote will be pivotal for the MPC’s outcome.
As already noted, the interest rate proposal put to a vote in the MPC
can originate in two ways: it can be prepared a priori or it can arise from the
meeting. In the latter case, it is natural to assume that the proposal represents
the majority view of all MPC members and that it is put to vote at the end of
the meeting. In the former case, we will assume that the proposal originates
as the majority view of the internal members of the MPC (the Board) and
emanates as the outcome of the pre-MPC meeting.10 The prior proposal can
in fact be presented at any point in the MPC meeting; in the extreme cases:
at the very beginning, i.e. before deliberations, or at the very end, i.e. just
before the ﬁnal vote. The timing of the prior proposal in the MPC meeting
aﬀects the voting choices of the MPC members.
The overall structure of the game is as follows. First, all MPC members
individually observe their private independent signals about the state of the
economy, A or B. Next, the pre-MPC meeting takes place: Board members
meet and simultaneously cast their votes, A or B, on a policy proposal for
the MPC meeting (at this point their private knowledge consists of their
private signals and the information they can deduce from expected pivotality
of their votes).11 The proposal originates as the majority view. Next, the
MPC meeting takes place: the Board’s proposal is revealed, either before or
after other MPC members have revealed their views, and subsequently all
MPC members cast their vote (at this point every Board member knows all
10This assumption, besides being required for a properly speciﬁed voting game in the case
of a prior interest rate proposal, has a number of attractive features. Obviously, it allows
for a meaningful comparison with the case when no prior proposal is made. Moreover, it
can also be easily interpreted as the Chair’s proposal.
In the latter situation, one need not distinguish between the accuracy of judgment of the
Board and the non-Board members, only between the Chair and the rest of the MPC. This
is because the accuracy of judgment of the Board members now becomes irrelevant for the
accuracy of the policy proposal; the only relevant judgment is the one of the Chair. Secondly,
in this situation there is strictly speaking no need for the pre-MPC meeting - the Chair can
simply make her proposal at the beginning of the policy meeting (implying m = 1 in our
model). Alternatively, one could imagine the pre-MPC meeting to take place purely for the
sake of the Chair enforcing her view on other Board members (which is not necessarily a
rational approach in our model); in this case m still corresponds to the total number of the
Board members (including the Chair) but the accuracy of the proposal remains equal to the
accuracy of the Chair’s judgment.
11See the Appendix for a detailed explanation.
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private signals and possibly the proposal; all MPC members also have the
information they can deduce from expected pivotality of their votes). The
MPC decision is again the majority outcome of the vote. Finally, the state of
the economy materializes and the payoﬀs are realized. Note that we make two
simplifying assumptions: members do not interact between the voting stages
and there is no new information available to the MPC members between the
stages of the game.
Note that in an ideal world, with all MPC members sharing common
objectives, their superior strategy would be to meet and truthfully reveal all
their private signals. The signals should be then aggregated by an appropriate
(majority) rule. This would imply that members would reach perfect agree-
ment and would never dissent. However, reality is diﬀerent. Even though
MPC members meet and reveal their information to one another by delib-
erating, the revelation must be imperfect, since we observe dissents in the
voting stage (see section 2). Imperfect revelation of private information can
be justiﬁed by the fact, that the private information in our set-up goes beyond
pure veriﬁable economic data and encompasses judgmental elements, beliefs
about the structure of the economy, ’frames of mind’, etc. Information so
deﬁned is diﬃcult to share perfectly, and our model captures exactly that.
4 Theoretical predictions
We will start our theoretical contribution by showing what types of equilibria
can arise in the MPC voting game when the policy proposal is prepared a
priori. We will show that the prior policy proposal has similar eﬀects on
MPC members as central bank communication has on private sector agents
in the seminal contribution by Morris and Shin (2002). The policy proposal
is a common signal observed by all MPC members in the meeting, acts as a
focal point and has disproportionately large eﬀects on their voting behaviour,
crowding out their private information. We will show that, as in Morris and
Shin (2002), it is also likely to lower the MPC members’ welfare, deﬁned as
the (prior) probability that the MPC will reach the correct policy decision.
However, we will also prove the existence of other voting equilibria, which
yield higher social welfare. These results are summarized in Proposition 1
below.
Proposition 1 The announcement of a prior policy proposal early in the
MPC meeting, before other MPC members have revealed their preferred policy
options, gives rise to three possible voting equilibria:
1. A herding equilibrium, where all MPC members follow the prior pro-
posal. The proposal is adopted with no dissents. This equilibrium is
more likely to arise, the larger the Board or the larger its judgment
advantage relative to non-Board members.
2. An informative equilibrium, where the Board supports the prior proposal
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private preferred policy options. The proposal may be overruled if the
Board has no majority in the MPC. Most likely there will be dissents
among non-Board MPC members. This equilibrium is more likely to
arise, the smaller the Board and the smaller its judgment advantage
relative to non-Board members.
3. A cheap-talk equilibrium, where even the Board does not support the
prior proposal at the voting stage; all MPC members vote in line with
their private preferred policy options. The proposal is irrelevant for the
MPC’s outcome. Almost certainly there will be dissents among Board
and non-Board MPC members. This equilibrium is more likely to arise,
the smaller the Board and the smaller its judgment advantage relative
to non-Board members.
Intuitively, these results can be linked to the member’s utility function,
as speciﬁed in (1)-(2), that is: their desire to arrive at the correct decision.
These preferences imply that rational members look for the best piece of
evidence about the state of the economy, depending on what they believe other
members will do. Hence, when the Board presents its policy proposal at the
beginning of the meeting it is a piece of public information for the non-Board
members. If the latter have grounds to believe that the proposal represents
a highly accurate signal about the state of the economy (e.g. because they
believe the judgment of the Board to be vastly superior and/or because the
Board is large), it acts as a focal point (Morris and Shin, 2002) and crowds
out their private information in that they rationally choose to forego their
own (relatively lesser) judgment and to follow the proposal. Alternatively, if
MPC members do not believe that the proposal is highly accurate and/or they
expect others to do the same, they may ignore it and stick to their private
opinions.
Comparison of ﬁgures 1A through 4A in the appendix gives indications
that for some combinations of judgment levels and numbers of Board and
non-Board members, multiple voting equilibria can exist. We address this
issue of multiplicity by assuming that MPC members will choose to play the
more eﬃcient equilibrium , i.e. the one which renders a higher accuracy of the
MPC’s outcome. The upper panel of ﬁgure 1 illustrates which equilibria can
arise in the MPC game for two 11-member MPCs: one where the Board has
majority (of 7 members, left panel) and one where the Board is in minority
(of 5 members, right panel). These choices regarding size and composition are
only illustrative and motivated by actual MPCs (both the US and the UK
for example have committees where the Board is in majority, while Japan
and the euro area have committees where the Board is in minority).12 The
horizontal (vertical) axes measure the accuracy of the individual judgment
12Figure 1 illustrates that for the size and composition of the MPCs chosen, the diﬀerences
are relatively small. Larger diﬀerences are obtained for more extreme MPCs (both in terms
of size and composition), but these are not observed in real life.
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where the herding equilibrium can arise, the checked one - the informative
equilibrium and the shaded one - the cheap-talk equilibrium. The white area
represents the region where none of the three equilibria will occur (but other
equilibria are possible, as we will discuss below). As expected, we observe
that the regions overlap, meaning that multiple voting equilibria are possible.
Figure 1 shows that it is most likely that the MPC game with a prior policy
proposal presented at the beginning of the meeting will result in the herding
equilibrium. In other words, the presentation of the prior policy proposal at
the beginning of the meeting is most likely to result in the MPC adopting
the proposal without any dissents. The existence of other equilibria, where at
least some of the MPC members vote in line with their private information and
possibly dissent from the prior proposal, is far less likely; moreover, they are
never unique - they arise under circumstances where the herding equilibrium
exists as well.
m = 7,n = 4 m = 5,n = 6
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July 2009Notes to Figure 1. m (n) denotes the number of Board (non-Board) members.
qB (qNB) denotes the accuracy of judgment of the Board (non-Board) members.
Dotted/checked/shaded areas represent herding/informative/cheap talk (simple ma-
jority) equilibria and collective outcomes, respectively.
To see which equilibrium will be played, we need to investigate the ac-
curacy of the MPC decisions achieved in each of the equilibria. These are
illustrated in the lower panel of ﬁgure 1. The dotted area represents the re-
gion where the highest accuracy of the MPC decision is achieved when all
MPC members follow the prior policy proposal. The checked area depicts
the region where the highest accuracy is achieved when only Board members
support the proposal and non-Board members vote in line with their pri-
vate signals. Finally, the shaded area illustrates the best collective outcomes
achieved when all individual MPC members vote in line with their private
signals in spite of the prior proposal.13
Comparing the upper and lower panels in ﬁgure 1 illustrates the Morris
and Shin (2002) result, i.e. the disproportionately large eﬀect of the prior
policy proposal on the voting behaviour of privately informed MPC members,
relatively to the socially desirable outcomes. While the upper panels show
that the herding equilibrium is the one that is most likely to arise, the lower
panels show that herding is not most likely to result in the highest accuracy
of MPC’s outcomes. According to the lower panels, the highest accuracy of
MPC’s outcomes is most likely achieved when all MPC members vote in line
with their private information, that is: under pure simple majority. This
mismatch between individual and collective incentives can be corrected by an
appropriate organization of the MPC meeting. When the (relative) judgment
levels of the two types of MPC members fall into the shaded regions in the
lower panels, there should be no prior policy proposal prepared for the MPC
meeting; the proposal should arise endogenously as a majority position of the
opinions expressed by the members in the meeting.
Regarding the cases when the highestaccuracy of MPC decisions is achieved
when Board members support the proposal but non-Board members vote in
line with their private information, the upper and lower panels show that
the individual and social incentives are relatively well aligned; the checked
areas appear to overlap. However, it can be shown that this is not a general
result: the smaller the Board and the larger the number of non-Board mem-
bers, the larger the misalignment of the incentives. Again, one can correct
this mismatch by an appropriate organization of the MPC meeting: when
13In the situation when the Chair alone prepares and presents the policy proposal, the
conﬁguration of the best collective outcomes in the case without the pre-MPC meeting is
similar to the left panel in ﬁgure 1, with qB measuring the judgment of the Chair (although
now the informative equilibrium outcomes are equal to the simple majority outcomes). In
the case of the pre-MPC meeting being used by the Chair to enforce her view in the Board,
the conﬁguration of the best collective outcomes is similar to the right panel in ﬁgure 1,
with qB measuring the judgment of the Chair (although the dotted area, where the herding
equilibrium outcomes dominate, is much smaller).
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els, the proposal should be prepared prior to the MPC meeting but in the
meeting it should be presented later, after non-Board members have revealed
their preferred policy options. The MPC should moreover agree to adopt the
prior proposal only if a suﬃcient number of non-Board members have ex-
pressed the same preference before hearing the proposal. This agreement will
increase the likelihood of an informative equilibrium to arise, as Proposition
2 below shows.
Proposition 2 The announcement of a prior policy proposal late in the MPC
meeting, after non-Board MPC members have revealed their preferred policy
options, allows for the informative voting equilibrium to arise for 0.5 < qNB <
1, 0.5 < qB < 1 and all committee sizes. It requires that the MPC agrees to
adopt the prior proposal iﬀ at least n+m+1
2 − m non-Board MPC members
have independently expressed preference for the same policy option.
Summarizing, we have shown that when the prior policy proposal is pre-
sented early in the MPC meeting, the most likely scenario is that all MPC
members will choose to follow it and the proposal will be adopted without dis-
sents. This scenario, however, need not deliver the highest accuracy of MPC
decisions, especially if the judgment level of the non-Board members is high.
The mismatch can be corrected by an appropriate design of the MPC meet-
ing, for example by having no prior policy proposal at all. The superiority of
any of the arrangements depends on the (relative) judgment levels of the two
types of MPC members. This relationship, illustrated in the lower panels of
ﬁgure 1, is quantiﬁed in table 3 below, which shows the probabilities that a
particular organization of the MPC meeting yields the highest accuracy of the
collective decision, given the judgment level of the non-Board members. The
table illustrates clearly that in general the best meeting structure is not to
have a policy proposal at all (unless the judgment of the non-Board members
is very poor). The table also shows that the interim option of preparing the
policy proposal in advance but postponing its presentation to the end of the
MPC meeting is not very likely to yield superior outcomes. This is in general
because of a ﬁne marginal balancing between the beneﬁts of delegating the
decision to the Board with on average better judgment on the one hand, and
using all members’ individual independent information on the other.
No prior proposal Proposal late Proposal early
0.5 ≤ qNB ≤ 0.6 21% 8% 71%
0.6 ≤ qNB ≤ 0.7 58% 12% 30%
0.7 ≤ qNB ≤ 0.8 83% 6% 11%
0.8 ≤ qNB ≤ 0.9 95% 2% 3%
0.9 ≤ qNB ≤ 1.0 99% 0% 1%
Table 3. Distribution of superior meeting organizations (m = 5,n = 6)
See notes to Figure 1.
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The above analysis assumed that MPC members are certain about the level
of each other’s expertise. We now relax this restriction and assume that
the accuracy of individual judgment cannot be perfectly assessed or observed
by other committee members, although it can be correctly assessed by the
individual herself.14 Formally, we will assume that qB and qNB cannot be




NB =qNB + εNB (8)
qobs
B =qB + εB (9)
where it still holds that 0.5 < qobs
NB < 1 and 0.5 < qobs
B < 1. εB, εNB are IID
zero-average assessment errors.
The assumption of imperfectly observable judgment implies that policy-
making may suﬀer from errors, where the assessment of the policy-makers’
judgment is important. In our voting model, a correct assessment is rele-
vant for the collective outcome in two ways. It ﬁrst of all aﬀects members’
choices of rational voting strategies and, consequently, the existence of vot-
ing equilibria. It secondly aﬀects the selection between multiple equilibria:
when multiple individual voting equilibria are possible, the individual MPC
member will play the one that she expects will deliver the most accurate
collective decision. Of course, the actual quality of the MPC decision will
depend on the true judgment of members (this quality is depicted in the
lower panels of ﬁgure 1).15 We illustrate these two eﬀects in ﬁgure 2 be-
low, drawn for two 11-member MPCs, as in ﬁgure 1 (one where the Board
has majority - left panel, and one where the Board is in minority - right
panel), and under the assumption of a relatively small degree of uncertainty:
qobs
B → U[qB − 0.05,qB + 0.05] and qobs
NB → U[qNB − 0.05,qNB + 0.05] (e.g.
non-Board members believing that Board members’ judgment accuracy is be-
tween 70 and 80 per cent and vice versa). Note that, to satisfy the conditions
0.5 < qobs
NB < 1 and 0.5 < qobs
B < 1, ﬁgure 3 must be drawn for the true
judgments 0.55 < qNB < 0.95 and 0.55 < qB < 0.95. Hence it is somewhat
zoomed in relative to ﬁgure 1.
The interpretation of the upper panel in ﬁgure 2 is analogous to ﬁgure
1: it depicts regions where the various individual voting equilibria can occur.
The comparison of the two ﬁgures shows that the uncertainty seems to have
little eﬀect on the existence of the voting equilibria. However, this is not a
general result: with higher uncertainty the existence of the cheap-talk (or:
14Uncertain level of judgment has not been frequently modeled in the jury literature.
Recent related work includes Visser and Swank (2007).
15In formal terms, uncertainty about one another’s judgment implies that rationality
conditions for diﬀerent voting strategies, as described in the appendix, will be speciﬁed




N and will have to be solved as integrals (unless
the random variable cancels out). The comparison of collective outcomes under diﬀerent





have to be solved as integrals.
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than under certainty; the existence of the herding equilibrium is hardly af-
fected while the region where the informative equilibrium exists is somewhat
shifted. Intuitively, faced with uncertainty about each other’s judgment, MPC
members become less likely to vote independently in the MPC meeting (under
cheap-talk with prior proposal, the assessment of the informational content of
pivotal situations becomes particularly diﬃcult for both types of MPC mem-
bers; this issue is less relevant in the herding equilibrium, where no member
expects to be pivotal, and in the informative equilibrium, where no Board
member expects to be pivotal).
The lower panels in ﬁgure 2 depicts regions where both types of MPC
members (Board and non-Board) estimate a particular individual voting strat-
egy (herding (dotted region), informative (checked region), and cheap talk
(shaded region)), to generate the highest accuracy of the MPC decision, treat-
ing the judgment of the other group as uncertain. In other words, this panel
is the benchmark that members use for determining which of the multiple
equilibria they will play. Comparison to the lower panels in ﬁgure 1 reveals
that uncertainty also has an eﬀect on the ordering and selection of equilibria.
In general, uncertainty introduces a wedge in the preferences for a particular
equilibrium between the two types of MPC members: Board members more
often assess the herding equilibrium as superior while non-Board members
(uncertain about the quality of the policy proposal) are more likely to see
the cheap-talk (or: simple majority) outcomes as superior. Since a particu-
lar outcome must be selected by both types of members, the general eﬀect
of uncertainty on the ordering of equilibria is the following: the higher the
uncertainty, the larger the reduction in the regions where particular equilibria
would be chosen by all MPC members and the larger the regions where no
equilibrium could be chosen. Hence, a proper meeting organization becomes
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Figure 2. Individual voting equilibria and optimal collective
voting behaviour under uncertainty
See notes to Figure 1.
5 Concluding observations
The organization the MPC meeting and the timing of the interest rate pro-
posal are not immaterial to policy outcomes. Under certain conditions, max-
imizing the quality of monetary policy dictates that the proposal should be
made prior to the MPC meeting. Alternatively, the proposal should emanate
from the discussion during the meeting, as an aggregation of the views ex-
pressed by all the members. Our analysis indicates that the latter is almost
always preferable.
Applying our ﬁndings to real life monetary policy committees, it seems
that the central banking profession has generally become better at judging
the state of the economy and choosing appropriate policy actions, meaning
that all MPCs have been moving towards the upper right corner in ﬁgures
1 and 2 in the previous section. That means that nowadays the dominance
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to have detrimental eﬀects for policy than in the past. Indeed, our analysis
suggests that MPCs comprised of members that can be considered experts in
the ﬁeld of monetary policy, should be set up in a way that best ensures an
individualistic (voting) behaviour.
While the main motivation of this research is based on real life, i.e. mon-
etary policy committees of the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England,
our analysis is highly stylized and contains some important caveats. This
should be kept in mind when interpreting our results. Our analysis assumes
rationality of MPC members, which requires substantial cognitive (and com-
puting) capacities that our MPC members should be endowed with in order
to derive the optimal voting strategies (which becomes obvious upon reading
the appendix to this paper). Our analysis allows for one relaxation of this
stringent assumption: the possibility of members making errors in the assess-
ment of each others’ judgment. We show that the consequences of such errors
could potentially be serious (in terms of accuracy of the collective decision).
The overall message of this paper therefore is that continued research into
the way collective monetary policy decisions making processes are organized
is important because such an organization is not immaterial for the quality
of monetary policy.
Appendix: Formal analysis
Proposition 1. The announcement of a prior policy proposal early in the
MPC meeting, before other MPC members have revealed their preferred policy
options, gives rise to three possible voting equilibria:
1. A herding equilibrium, where all MPC members follow the prior pro-
posal. The proposal is adopted with no dissents. This equilibrium is
more likely to arise, the larger the Board or the larger its judgment
advantage relative to non-Board members.
2. An informative equilibrium, where the Board supports the prior proposal
but non-Board members ignore the proposal and vote in line with their
private preferred policy options. The proposal may be overruled if the
Board has no majority in the MPC. Most likely there will be dissents
among non-Board MPC members. This equilibrium is more likely to
arise, the smaller the Board and the smaller its judgment advantage
relative to non-Board members.
3. A cheap-talk equilibrium, where even the Board does not support the
prior proposal at the voting stage; all MPC members vote in line with
their private preferred policy options. The proposal is irrelevant for the
MPC’s outcome. Almost certainly there will be dissents among Board
and non-Board MPC members. This equilibrium is more likely to arise,
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elements of the game, then we deﬁne sequentially rational voting strategies
and a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the voting game. Next, we analyze the
voting game with the policy proposal and its equilibria. The analysis proceeds
backwards, i.e. ﬁrst we derive the voting strategies of the MPC members in
the MPC meeting and then for the Board members in the pre-MPC meeting
(where we assume the prior policy proposal is formulated).
The players in our Bayesian voting game are MPC members, m (odd)
Board members and n (even) non-Board members. At the beginning of the
game, nature sends private independent signals to all MPC members, si ∈
{A,B}, hence each member can be of type A or B, depending on the private
signal received. The signals are imperfect, as explained in the main text
(conditions (3)-(4)).
The set of states is the set of all lists {x,s1,...,sm+n,P} where x ∈ {a,b}
denotes the state of the economy, s1,...,sm+n are the private signals of all
MPC members, and P ∈ {A,B} is the policy proposal made by the Board in
the MPC meeting (which in our model is an ’aggregation’ of Board members’
private signals).
At each point in time, the set of actions for any type of MPC member is
a set of votes vi ∈ {A,B}. All individual votes are then ’aggregated’ into a
collective decision through a voting rule, which in our model is simple ma-
jority. The payoﬀs from each collective decision are identical for all members
and are given by equations (1) and (2) in the main text. The timing of the
game is as described in the main text (section 3).
Our solution concept is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Hence, MPC
members’ strategies will be sequentially rational given their beliefs and the
beliefs will be consistent, wherever possible, with the played strategies. A
sequentially rational voting (strategy) means that each time an MPC mem-
ber votes, she chooses a voting strategy that maximizes her expected utility,
calculated over all possible states of the world as well as voting strategies she
expects other members to follow. It has been shown by Austen-Smith and
Banks (1996) that in voting games, each committee member can restrict the
analysis of her voting strategy to the cases when her vote aﬀects the ﬁnal
outcome, i.e. when it is pivotal, if such cases exist.16 In our voting game,
with the payoﬀs speciﬁed above, the (sequentially) rational voting strategy for
every MPC member is at every stage of the game to support the alternative
that is more likely to be correct based on her information and beliefs.
1. Herding equilibrium
Every voting game has a herding equilibrium, where members ignore their
private signals and herd behind (follow) a common signal (see also Austen-
16The informational content of the fact that a vote is pivotal is determined by the voting
rule. In the case of pure simple majority and equal judgment, being pivotal does not
provide additional information, since other votes are equally split. This would e.g. not be
true under unanimity. For a more detailed analysis of the eﬀects of unanimous voting rules,
see Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Coughlan (2000) or Gerardi (2000).
25
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1070
July 2009Smith and Banks (1996)). In our game we will deﬁne a herding equilibrium as
the equilibrium where the rational strategy for all Board members (both type
A and B) is to vote in line with their private signals in the pre-MPC meeting
and subsequently support the proposal in the MPC meeting. The rational
strategy for all non-Board members (both types) is to ignore their private
signal and to follow (herd behind) the proposal in the MPC meeting. We will
now show that these strategies constitute a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
our game. Analyzing the game backwards, we start with the choice facing
any individual when she is to cast her vote in the MPC meeting.
In line with equation (7) in the main text, every MPC member prefers to
support the policy proposal P rather than vote in line with her private signal
in the MPC meeting, iﬀ the following conditions are met:17
Pi∈NB(b|P =B,si,follow) ≥ 0.5 (10)
Pi∈NB(a|P =A,si,follow) ≥ 0.5 (11)
for every non-Board member i, and:
Pj∈B(b|SB =⇒B,sj,follow) ≥ 0.5 (12)
Pj∈B(a|SB =⇒A,sj,follow) ≥ 0.5 (13)
for every Board member j. Pi(x|P = X,si,follow) denotes the probability
that the state of the economy is x, conditional on the policy proposal X,
member i’s private signal si, and the information deduced from the belief
that all other MPC members will follow the proposal. Since under this belief,
an individual vote is never pivotal for the MPC’s outcome, it provides no ad-
ditional information about the state of the world (note the diﬀerence with the
informative equilibrium below). In the case of Board members we recognize
the fact that any member observes the signals of all Board members in the
pre-MPC meeting, hence Pj(x|SB =⇒ X,sj,follow) denotes the probability
that the state of the economy is x, conditional on the vector of signals of other
Board members SB implying proposal X , member j’s private signal sj, and
the belief that all other MPC members will follow the proposal.
For any non-Board member of type B the above conditional probabilities
are given as:18
Pi(b|P =B,si = B,follow) =
qNBP(P=B|b)
qNBP(P=B|b)+(1−qNB)P(P=B|a) (14)
Pi(a|P =A,si = B,follow) =
(1−qNB)P(P=A|a)
(1−qNB)P(P=A|a)+qNBP(P=A|b) (15)
17See also Austen-Smith and Banks (1996).
18Where we assume symmetric priors, i.e. P(a) = P(b) = 0.5.
Since our set-up is perfectly symmetric (in the priors, decision-making rules and prefer-
ences), the results are symmetric as well. In this case, for example, the derivations for any
non-Board member of type A would be the same since:
P(b|P = B,si = A,follow) = P(a|P = A,si = B,follow)
P(a|P = A,si = A,follow) = P(b|P = B,si = B,follow)
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P(P = B|b), P(P = B|a), P(P = A|a) and P(P = A|b), i.e. the information
content of the Board’s possible policy proposals, are given as:
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For any Board member of type B, the above conditional probabilities are
given as:
Pj(b|SB =⇒ B,sj = B,follow) =
qBP(SB=⇒B|b,sj=B)
(qBP(SB =⇒ B|b,sj = B)
+(1 − qB)P(SB =⇒ B|a,sj = B))
(20)
Pj(a|SB =⇒ A,sj = B,follow) =
(1−qB)P(SB=⇒A|a,sj=B)
((1 − qB)P(SB =⇒ A|a,sj = B)
+qBP(SB =⇒ A|b,sj = B))
(21)
where, under the assumption that they all voted in line with their private
signals in the pre-MPC meeting:
P(SB =⇒ B|b,sj = B) = qx
B (1 − qB)
m−x for x = m−1
2 ,...,m − 1 (22)
P(SB =⇒ A|a,sj = B) = qx
B (1 − qB)
m−x for x = m+1
2 ,...,m − 1 (23)
P(SB =⇒ B|a,sj = B) = qm−x
B (1 − qB)
x for x = m−1
2 ,...,m − 1 (24)
P(SB =⇒ A|b,sj = B) = qm−x
B (1− qB)
x for x = m+1
2 ,...,m − 1 (25)









for x = m−1








for x = m+1
2 ,...,m − 1 (27)
To complete the proof of the existence of the herding equilibrium as deﬁned
above, we need to show that voting in line with private signals in the pre-MPC
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their proposal will be followed in the MPC meeting. Voting in line with her
private signal sj will be rational for any Board member j when the following
conditions are met:
Pj∈B(b|sj =B,pivotal) ≥ 0.5 (28)
Pj∈B(a|sj =A,pivotal) ≥ 0.5 (29)
where Pj(x|sj = X,pivotal) denotes the probability that the state of the
economy is x, conditional on the private signal X, and the information she
can deduce from the case(s) when her vote is pivotal for the MPC’s outcome.
Since she believes that other Board members will vote in line with their signals
and the proposal will be adopted by the MPC, she can rationally expect her
vote to be pivotal for the MPC’s outcome in one case, i.e. when it makes
a diﬀerence between the Board adopting proposal A or proposal B. This
requires that the votes of other Board members are equally split.







The information content of the pivotality of j’s vote under such conditions
can be calculated as follows:
PB (pivotal|b) = PB (pivotal|a) = q
m
2
B (1 − qB)
m
2 (32)
Hence, we can simplify:
Pj(b|sj = B,pivotal) = Pj(a|sj = A,pivotal) = qB ≥ 0.5 (33)
Conditions (18), (19), (26), (27) and (33) specify the region where the
herding equilibrium exists for our voting game. Condition (33) is satisﬁed
by assumption. It can be also shown that conditions (18), (26) and (27) are
satisﬁed for all 0.5 < qNB < 1 and 0.5 < qB < 1; only condition (19) is not.19
The area where condition (19) is satisﬁed will therefore deﬁne the area where
the herding equilibrium exists, and is illustrated in ﬁgure 1A below.
19Conditions (26) and (27) are satisﬁed for all 0.5 < qNB < 1 and 0.5 < qB < 1 iﬀ
x ≥
m+1
2 , i.e. if the votes of Board members other than j were split in favour of one
alternative. If x =
m−1
2 , i.e. if the votes were equally split, they would be uninformative
about the state of the economy and an individual j would choose to follow her private signal
rather than support the proposal.
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(m = 3 - left panel; and m = 21 - right panel)
Hence, the herding equilibrium will always exist if Board members have
a relative judgment advantage. It is also more likely to exist if the Board is
large. This is because both a judgment advantage and a large Board size imply
that the policy proposal is very likely to provide a superior signal regarding
the state of the economy and it therefore becomes rational for MPC members,
who are solely interested in the accuracy of their collective decision, to follow
it.
2. Informative equilibrium
We now turn to the question whether our voting game also has an informa-
tive equilibrium, deﬁned as the equilibrium where all Board members (both
type A and B) vote in line with their private signals in the pre-MPC meeting
and support the proposal in the MPC meeting, and all non-Board members
(both types) vote in line with their private signals in the MPC meeting (thus
ignoring the proposal). Again, we start with the choice facing any individual
when she is to cast her vote in the MPC meeting.
For every non-Board member i, voting in line with her private signal si
and ignoring the Board’s proposal is rational iﬀ the following conditions are
met:
Pi∈NB(b|P,si =B,pivotal) ≥ 0.5 (34)
Pi∈NB(a|P,si =A,pivotal) ≥ 0.5 (35)
where Pi(x|P,si = X,pivotal) denotes the probability that the state of the
economy is x, conditional on the policy proposal P, private signal X, and
the information deduced from the case(s) when her vote is pivotal for the
MPC’s outcome. The belief that all other non-Board members vote in line
with their private signals while all Board members will support the proposal
P implies that her vote will be pivotal in one case, i.e. when the votes of
other non-Board members’ are split n+m−1
2 −m for the same policy option as
the proposal P and n+m−1
2 for the other policy option.
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ities can be written out as:
Pi(b|P = B,si = B,pivotal) =
qNBP(P=B|b)PNB(pivotal|b,P=B)
(qNBP(P = B|b)PNB (pivotal|b,P = B)
+(1− qNB)P(P = B|a)PNB (pivotal|a,P = B))
(36)
Pi(a|P = B,si = A,pivotal) =
qNBP(P=B|a)PNB(pivotal|a,P=B)
(qNBP(P = B|a)PNB (pivotal|a,P = B)
+(1 − qNB)P(P = B|b)PNB (pivotal|b,P = B))
(37)
The informational content of i’s vote being pivotal under such conditions is
given as:
PNB (pivotal|b,P = B) = q
n+m−1
2 −m
NB (1 − qNB)
n+m−1
2 (38)




















































B (1 − qB)
s (41)
Regarding Board members, we have shown above that supporting the
policy proposal in the MPC meeting is always rational for any Board member
type, given her beliefs that all other MPC members will follow the proposal
as well. The proof of rationality under beliefs that only Board members will
support the proposal in the MPC meeting is analogous.
Moving to the pre-MPC meeting, consider the choice facing any Board
member j. For the informative equilibrium to exist, we need to prove that
voting in line with her private signal sj in the pre-MPC meeting is rational,
given her beliefs that other Board members vote in line with their signals
in the pre-MPC meeting and all non-Board members will vote in line with
their signals in the MPC meeting. This strategy is sequentially rational iﬀ
the following conditions are met:
Pj∈B(b|sj =B,pivotal) ≥ 0.5 (42)
Pj∈B(a|sj =A,pivotal) ≥ 0.5 (43)
where Pj(x|sj = X,pivotal) denotes the probability that the state of the
economy is x, conditional on the private signal X, and the information she
can deduce from the case(s) when her vote is pivotal for the MPC’s outcome.
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pre-MPC meeting and non-Board members will vote in line with their signals
in the MPC meeting implies that her vote will be pivotal for the MPC’s
outcome in m cases,20 i.e. when it makes a diﬀerence between the Board
adopting proposal A or proposal B while the votes of non-Board members
are split in such a way that the Board’s proposal will receive the majority
of the MPC, i.e. between n+m+1
2 − m and n+m+1
2 − 1 of votes for the same
policy option as the proposal and the rest for the other policy option.
Hence, the above conditional probabilities are given as:
Pj(b|sj =B,pivotal) =
qB ￿ PB(pivotal|b,sj=B)
qB ￿ PB(pivotal|b,sj=B)+(1−qB)￿ PB(pivotal|a,sj=B) (44)
Pj(a|sj =A,pivotal) =
qB ￿ PB(pivotal|a,sj=A)
qB ￿ PB(pivotal|a,sj=A)+(1−qB) ￿ PB(pivotal|b,sj=A) (45)
The informational content of j’s vote being pivotal for the MPC’s outcome
under such conditions can be calculated as:
￿ PB (pivotal|b,sj = B) = q
m
2












NB (1 − qNB)
n−x
(46)
= ￿ PB (pivotal|a,sj = A)
￿ PB (pivotal|a,sj = B) = q
m
2












NB (1 − qNB)
x
(47)
= ￿ PB (pivotal|b,sj = A)
Hence, the Board member rationality conditions (42)-(43) are equivalent and






















NB (1 − qNB)
n−x
(48)
Again, conditions (40), (41), and (48) specify the region where the infor-
mative equilibrium exists. It can be shown that condition (48) is satisﬁed for
any 0.5 < qNB < 1 and 0.5 < qB < 1, m and n; conditions (40) and (41) are
not. The area where they are satisﬁed simultaneously will therefore deﬁne
the area where the informative equilibrium exists, and is illustrated in ﬁgure
2A below.
20This is because an individual Board member vote swings the position of the whole
m-head Board in the MPC meeting.
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(m = 3 - left panel; and m = 21 - right panel)
Hence, the informative equilibrium is more likely to exist if the Board is
not large and if it has a slight relative judgment advantage, or in other words:
if the Board’s proposal is not very likely to provide a superior signal regarding
the state of the economy. The informative equilibrium will clearly not exist
if the Board is large.
3. Cheap-talk equilibrium
We now prove that our voting game also has a cheap-talk equilibrium, i.e.
an equilibrium where it is sequentially rational for all Board and non-Board
members (both types A and B) to always vote in line with their private
signals. Hence, the pre-MPC meeting votes become irrelevant for the MPC’s
outcome and turn into cheap-talk messages. Again, we start with the choice
facing any individual when she is to cast her vote in the MPC meeting.
Every MPC member prefers to vote in line with her private signal, rather
than follow the policy proposal, iﬀ the following conditions are met:
Pi∈NB(b|P,si =B,pivotal) ≥ 0.5 (49)
Pi∈NB(a|P,si =A,pivotal) ≥ 0.5 (50)
for every non-Board member i, and:
Pj∈B(b|SB,sj =B,pivotal) ≥ 0.5 (51)
Pj∈B(a|SB,sj =A,pivotal) ≥ 0.5 (52)
for every Board member j. Pi(x|P,si = X,pivotal) denotes the probability
that the state of the economy is x, conditional on the policy proposal P, the
private signal X, and the information deduced from the case(s) when her
vote is pivotal for the MPC’s outcome. Since she believes that all other MPC
members will vote in line with their signals, she can rationally expect her vote
to be pivotal in one case, i.e. when other votes are equally split. The presen-
tation of the Board’s proposal in the MPC meeting will give her additional
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will vote. In the case of Board members we again recognize the fact that any
member observes the signals of all Board members in the pre-MPC meeting,
hence Pj(x|SB,sj = X,pivotal) denotes the probability that the state of the
economy is x, conditional on the vector of signals of other Board members SB,
the private signal X, and the information deduced from the case(s) when her
vote is pivotal for the MPC’s outcome. When voting in the MPC meeting,
the individual Board member uses her knowledge of other Board members’
signals in determining the pivotality of her vote, i.e. if the votes of other
Board members were split x for one option against m − 1 − x for the other
option in the pre-MPC meeting, she will expect her vote to be pivotal for the
MPC’s outcome only when non-Board members’ votes are split n+m−1
2 − x
for the same policy option as the x Board members and
n−(m−1)
2 + x for the
other policy option.
Assuming that the Board’s proposal is B, the above conditional probabil-
ities for any non-Board member can be written out as:
Pi(b|P = B,si = B,pivotal) =
qNB ￿ PNB(pivotal|b,P=B)
(qNB ￿ PNB (pivotal|b,P = B)
+(1 − qNB) ￿ PNB (pivotal|a,P = B))
(53)
Pi(a|P = B,si = A,pivotal) =
qNB ￿ PNB(pivotal|a,P=B)
(qNB ￿ PNB (pivotal|a,P = B)
+(1 − qNB) ￿ PNB (pivotal|b,P = B))
(54)
The informational content of the i’s vote being pivotal under such conditions
is given as:









































































































It can be shown that neither of the two above conditions is always satisﬁed.
The area where they are is illustrated in ﬁgure 3A below. Hence, it is rational
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meeting and ignore the policy proposal if the judgment levels of the two types
of members are not too dissimilar, or in other words: if the Board’s proposal is
not very likely to provide a superior signal regarding the state of the economy.
It is less likely to be rational for non-Board members to vote in line with their
private signals if the Board is large.
Figure 3A. The cheap-talk equilibrium (I)
(m = 3 - left panel; and m = 21 - right panel)
Turning to Board members, and assuming that the vector of other Board
members’ votes implies proposal B, the above conditional probabilities are
given as:




￿ ￿ PB (pivotal|b,SB =⇒ B,sj = B)
+(1− qB) ￿ ￿ PB (pivotal|a,SB =⇒ B,sj = B))
(59)




￿ ￿ PB (pivotal|a,SB =⇒ B,sj = A)
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July 2009The information content of the j’s vote being pivotal for the MPC’s outcome
can be calculated as:
￿ ￿ PB (pivotal|b,SB =⇒ B,sj = B) = qx




NB (1 − qNB)
n−(m−1)
2 +x
for x = m−1
2 ,...,m − 1 (61)
￿ ￿ PB (pivotal|a,SB =⇒ B,sj = B) = qm−x
B (1 − qB)






for x = m−1
2 ,...,m − 1 (62)
￿ ￿ PB (pivotal|a,SB =⇒ B,sj = A) = q
m−x
B (1 − qB)






for x = m+1
2 ,...,m − 1 (63)
￿ ￿ PB (pivotal|b,SB =⇒ B,sj = A) = qx




NB (1 − qNB)
n−(m−1)
2 +x
for x = m+1
2 ,...,m − 1 (64)










for x = m−1










for x = m+1
2 ,...,m − 1 (66)
It can be shown that these conditions need not be simultaneously satis-
ﬁed.21 The area where the conditions are satisﬁed is illustrated in ﬁgure 4A
below. Note that the size of the majority of other Board members’ votes now
becomes important, hence the four panels. It is rational for Board members
to vote in line with their private signals in the MPC meeting under two con-
ditions: (i) if the size of the majority of other Board members’ votes, that
they observed in the pre-MPC meeting, is not too highly informative of the
state of the economy (otherwise they would be inclined to follow that ma-
jority) and (ii) if they believe that their own judgment is superior to that of
non-Board members (otherwise they would be inclined to follow what they
believe the majority of non-Board members is). It is clearly not rational for
Board members to vote in the MPC meeting against a large majority of the
(large) Board as revealed in the pre-MPC meeting.
21Unless x =
m−1
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July 2009Figure 4A. The cheap-talk equilibrium (II)
(m = 3 - left panel; and m = 21 - right panel)
(x = m+1
2 - upper panel; and x = m − 1 - lower panel)
To complete the proof of the existence of the cheap-talk equilibrium as
deﬁned above, we need to show that voting in line with private signals in
the pre-MPC meeting is sequentially rational for all Board members, given
the belief that their proposal will not be automatically adopted in the MPC
meeting. As we have explained above, the fact that MPC members will vote
in line with their signals in the MPC meeting makes the Board members’
votes in the pre-meeting immaterial for the MPC’s outcome (however, these
votes will provide information that will be used in determining members’
voting strategies in the MPC meeting, as we have seen above). In general,
for cheap talk to be informative, three conditions need to be satisﬁed (see e.g.
Gibbons (1992)): (i) diﬀerent sender types have diﬀerent preferences over
receivers’ actions, (ii) receivers prefer diﬀerent actions depending on senders’
types, and (iii) receivers preferences over actions are not completely opposed
to the senders’.22 In our game, Board members are the senders of the common
22The cheap-talk game always has a babbling equilibrium, i.e. a babbling equilibrium
where the Board members would not vote in line with their private signals in the pre-MPC
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and receivers of messages (votes) in the pre-MPC meeting; members’ types
are deﬁned by their private signals. Clearly, the conditions for an informative
cheap talk to arise are satisﬁed.
As a result we can conclude that the cheap-talk equilibrium constitutes a
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of our voting game, albeit in the small region
where conditions (57), (58), (65) and (66) are simultaneously satisﬁed, i.e.
where the shaded areas in ﬁgures 3A and 4A overlap.
Proposition 2. The announcement of a prior policy proposal late in the
MPC meeting, after non-Board MPC members have revealed their preferred
policy options, allows for the informative voting equilibrium to arise for 0.5 <
qNB < 1, 0.5 < qB < 1 and all committee sizes. It requires that the MPC
agrees to adopt the prior proposal iﬀ at least n+m+1
2 − m non-Board MPC
members have independently expressed preference for the same policy option.
Proof. Formally, the structure of the MPC game is now a little bit diﬀerent
than in Proposition 1: First, all MPC members individually observe their
private independent signals about the state of the economy. Next, the pre-
MPC meeting takes place. Then, the MPC meeting takes place: non-Board
members ’cast’ their votes and subsequently the Board’s proposal is revealed.
The MPC decision is the majority outcome. Finally, the state of the economy
materializes and the payoﬀs are realized.
The proof is therefore partially equivalent to the proof of the existence
of an informative equilibrium under Proposition 1. For Board members, ra-
tionality conditions and beliefs remain the same, hence the same results ap-
ply. The diﬀerence lies in the rationality conditions for non-Board members;
speciﬁcally in the fact that they do not observe the Board’s proposal before
revealing their preferred policy options in the MPC meeting. Hence their in-
dividual beliefs regarding the informational content of the pivotality of their
votes change.
We will now show that it is rational for any non-Board member i to vote
in line with her private signal si iﬀ the following conditions are met:
Pi∈NB(b|si =B,pivotal) ≥ 0.5 (67)
Pi∈NB(a|si =A,pivotal) ≥ 0.5 (68)
where Pi(x|si = X,pivotal) denotes the probability that the state of the econ-
omy is x, conditional on the private signal X, and the information deduced
from the case(s) when her vote is pivotal for the MPC’s outcome. The be-
lief that all other non-Board members vote in line with their private signals
while all Board members support the proposal, and the MPC will adopt the
meeting (e.g. randomly or in favor of one option regardless of their private signals). As
a result their pre-MPC votes and the proposal will be rationally ignored by other MPC
members when deriving their voting strategies in the MPC meeting. This in turn will
justify the Board’s voting strategies in the pre-MPC meeting. However, we will ignore this
equilibrium here, as its outcome is equivalent to the situation when no prior policy proposal
is made by the Board and it is analyzed in the main text.
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the same option implies that her vote will be pivotal in two cases, when the
Board has adopted proposal B and votes of other non-Board members’ are
split n+m−1
2 − m for option B and n+m−1
2 for option A or when the Board
has adopted proposal A and votes of other non-Board members’ are split
n+m−1
2 − m for option A and n+m−1
2 for option B.
The above conditional probabilities are given as:
Pi(b|si =B,pivotal) =
qNB
￿ ￿ P NB(pivotal|b)
qNB






￿ ￿ PNB(pivotal|a)+(1−qNB)￿ ￿ P NB(pivotal|b)
(70)
The informational content of the i’s vote being pivotal under such conditions
is given as:































= ￿ ￿ PNB (pivotal|a) (71)
Hence the rationality conditions (67)-(68) can be simpliﬁed to one:
Pi(b|si = B,pivotal) = Pi(a|si = A,pivotal) = qNB ≥ 0.5 (72)
We have shown that it is sequentially rational for any non-Board member
i to vote in line with her private signal in the MPC meeting, if she believes
that other non-Board members vote in line with their private signals and the
Board’s prior proposal will be adopted by the MPC if a suﬃcient number (that
is, at least n+m+1
2 −m) of non-Board members have expressed preference for
the same option. This extends the existence of the informative equilibrium
in our game to the whole region 0.5 < qNB < 1 and 0.5 < qB < 1 and all
committee sizes.
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